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METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES IN DELIBERATIVE EMPIRICAL ETHICS  
Professor Stacy M Carter, University of Wollongong 
26 May 2020 
 
The empirical turn in bioethics and the deliberative turn in democracy theory occurred at around the 
same time, one at the intersection of bioethics and social science,(1, 2) the other at the intersection 
of political philosophy and political science.(3-5) Empirical bioethics and deliberative democratic 
approaches both engage with immediate problems in policy and practice with normative intent, so it 
was perhaps inevitable that they would eventually find one another,(6-8) and that deliberative 
research would become more common in bioethics.(9)  
This commentary responds to a paper by Ford et.al., who ran a single jury of 18 people in Brighton in 
the UK in June 2018.(10) The jury were asked to consider whether secondary research use of non-
structured, free text data from medical records should be permitted. I will consider three issues: the 
effort required in deliberative work, the challenge of sampling and selection of jurors, and the basis 
for drawing normative conclusions from deliberative research.  
First: this report makes clear the effort involved in running a jury. These researchers contracted an 
external agency experienced in the method, established an oversight committee of policymakers with 
power to act, developed expert witness briefs, selected witnesses and coordinated their testimony, 
and created a questionnaire to measure participants’ views, activities to support their understanding, 
and a scenario for consideration. Doing deliberative work takes significant time and resources, and 
this report evidences substantial commitment from the team.  
Second: to the always-challenging question of juror selection.  The deliberative democratic literature 
returns repeatedly to this problem: how do the participants in a deliberative process stand in relation 
to the broader public from which they are drawn? This matters because mini-publics are taken to be 
doing democratic—which is to say political—work: enacting a better form of democracy, one which is 
inclusive, deliberative, and involves active citizenship.(4) 
So: how to recruit and select an inclusive jury, or at least a jury where there is equality of opportunity 
to participate, or no systematic exclusion of affected publics?(4) The strategy used by Ford et al. is in 
line with accepted practices for recruiting a group demographically reflective of a population.(11) 
Stratifying a sample to match a population with respect to gender, age, ethnicity and educational 
attainment is expensive, time consuming and difficult; the fact that the authors have achieved this 
goal is a mark of their concern for quality in design. But deliberative theorists debate whether such a 
design can ensure legitimacy. Parkinson, for example, argued instead for equal representation of all 
relevant differences in deliberation, to ensure that no one position can dominate by sheer force of 
numbers.(5) Dryzek and Neimeyer argued from rationality, ontology and ethics for representing all 
relevant discourses in deliberative processes.(12)  
Although proportional demographic representation is not unusual in deliberative research, I have 
particular concerns about the use of a survey question to select these jurors. The researchers asked 
prospective jurors the Ipsos Mori 2016 survey question “How willing or unwilling would you be to 
allow your medical records to be used in a medical research study? The information given to 
researchers would not include your name, date of birth, address or any contact details.” Jurors were 
recruited proportionally using this question. That is, to reflect the prevalence of attitudes in the 
population, the researchers constructed a jury of 15 people who were willing to share, and 3 people 
who were unwilling to share, then asked these people whether data should be shared. It is not clear 
how participants’ attitudes on sharing intersected with other characteristics (e.g. whether those 
unwilling to share may have also been from groups, such as people of colour, younger people or 
women, who may feel less able to participate actively).  
In my view, this proportional sampling on attitudes potentially undermines the democratic legitimacy 
of the process. Presumably this jury was convened because the researchers thought the normative 
question “should free-text data be used for research?” was open, that is, that a good case could be 
made on either side. The final answer—yes it should—would be more convincing if the jury had not 
been stacked in favour of secondary use at the outset. As a deliberative researcher, I see this as a 
cautionary tale about the potentially significant effect of the accretion of small methodological choices 
on the final outcome.  
This also relates to my final observation, regarding how deliberative researchers can cross the bridge 
from is to ought, a bridge that empirical bioethics researchers have been reinforcing and redecorating 
for the last decade. Like Jackie Leach Scully, I hold that bioethics researchers should use empirical 
social science methods to understand people’s moral intuitions and judgements, but that researchers 
should make their own arguments for any normative implications that may follow.(13) Deliberative 
processes, however, are different to the interpretive methods more common in empirical bioethics. 
Deliberative methods arise from political theory, enact an ideal form of democracy, and are intended 
to have direct and indirect consequences in governance.(14) That is, juries are—at least in their ideal 
form—convened for the purpose of delivering legitimate normative recommendations to decision 
makers, from participants, on behalf of their fellow citizens.    
To have such normative force juries are generally expected to have certain characteristics, and in my 
view some of these were lacking here. Many deliberative researchers conduct multiple processes in 
diverse locations, rather than making recommendations based on a single jury. These jurors were not 
asked to prioritise the common good (and the scenario encouraged thinking about an individual 
patient), researchers counted the votes of individual jurors rather than encouraging the jurors to come 
to a collective position, lack of data from the deliberations makes it more difficult to evaluate 
reasoning and the authenticity of deliberation, and it’s hard to interpret the extensive concerns and 
suggestions expressed in light of the final votes. I would especially like to know whether support for 
data use was conditional on these issues being addressed. 
Given my concerns about sampling and interpretation, this process may be better understood, in 
Parkinson’s terms, as an information-gathering rather than a decision-making exercise.(5) The process 
certainly provides insight into the hopes and concerns of well-informed publics on secondary data use 
of this kind. The normative work of bridging these findings to policy action, however, is still to be done.   
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